Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is very competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality and each firm's product quality is private information (unknown to consumers and to other firms), we show that there exist fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria where low quality firms choose random pricing strategies, exercise market power and high quality firms charge higher prices than low quality firms. The market power and profits of low quality firms depend on the market power exercised by high quality firms and the latter varies considerably across revealing equilibria. There is a unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium satisfying the D1 refinement criterion; in this equilibrium too, both low and high quality firms may exhibit considerable market power. While the market power exercised by low quality firms vanishes as the number of firms becomes large, that for high quality firms may persist. Finally, every D1 equilibrium outcome involves some revelation of information.
Introduction
In many markets where consumers are not fully informed about product quality 1 prior to purchase, higher quality goods are often sold at relatively higher prices. One explanation for this is that firms are better informed about their product quality and set higher prices to signal higher quality to consumers. This is particularly relevant in markets where variation in the realized product qualities across firms arises, at least in part, from differences in exogenous factors affecting production technology, input quality and other elements of the production process.
In a market with a single seller (who has private information about exogenously given product quality that can be either high or low), Bagwell and Riordan (1991) show that high price may act as a signal of high quality. Their main argument is that the low quality seller has a lower marginal cost of production (relative to a high quality seller) and therefore finds it more profitable to sell higher quantity at a sufficiently lower price rather than imitate the lower quantity-higher price combination preferred by the high quality seller. 2 An important question that arises then is whether such signaling through prices can occur in markets with more than one seller. Dissuading low quality sellers from imitating the high price charged by high quality sellers requires that the former earn sufficient rent. However, competition between sellers may dissipate all or most of the rent required for signaling. In an imperfectly competitive (oligopoly) market where each firm's product quality is pure private information (not known to buyers or to other firms), Reinganum (2007, 2008) show that if, in addition to unobserved potential differences in product quality, there is sufficient horizontal differentiation among the products (so that price competition is soft enough), there is a unique symmetric separating equilibrium where the price charged by a firm signals its product quality. This, in turn, raises the question as to whether some degree of horizontal differentiation (or some other deviation from the perfectly competitive model that creates ex ante market power for firms through, say, firm or brand loyalty, search cost etc.) is necessary for signaling to occur through prices. The main contribution of this paper is to argue that this is not the case. In a model where quality is the only dimension on which firms' products may differ (so that the model reduces to the standard homogenous good Bertrand model in the absence of quality difference), we show the existence of fully revealing equilibria where the price charged by each firm perfectly signals its product quality and high quality is signaled by high price.
In particular, we consider a Bayesian model of price competition in a symmetric oligopoly where quality may be one of two types: high or low. Ex ante, product quality is privately known only to the firm supplying the product and is unknown to all consumers as well as to rival firms; this information structure is identical to that in Reinganum (2007, 2008 ) but unlike their model, there is no horizontal differentiation among the products of the firms. Apart from incomplete information, there is no other friction in the market. Production cost is lower in a firm producing low quality output than in a firm that produces high quality. Consumers are identical, have unit demand and value high quality more than low quality.
We show that even in this stark model with strong price competition, signaling occurs through prices. Incomplete information endogenously creates sufficient rent and market power to allow signaling. We establish the existence of fully revealing symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of the following kind. All high quality firms charge a deterministic high price with probability one, while every low quality firm chooses a mixed strategy (with a continuous distribution) over an interval of prices that lies entirely below this high quality price. The highest price charged by a low quality firm is such that consumers are indifferent between buying low quality at this price and buying high quality at the price charged by high quality firms. Low quality firms sell with probability one in states of the world where all other firms produce high quality. This stochastic monopoly power allows low quality firms to earn strictly positive expected profit. The mixed strategy followed by low quality firms arises from the need to balance this monopoly power with the incentive to undercut rivals' prices in states of the world where other firms also produce low quality. Price dispersion occurs as a pure consequence of private information about quality. 3 ,4 In the single seller's signaling problem analyzed by Bagwell and Riordan, signaling through prices may require an upward "distortion" in the high quality price (relative to the full information monopoly price) in order to reduce the quantity sold by the high quality type so as to deter the low quality type from imitating his action. When there are competing multiple sellers in the market, in order for low quality types to earn sufficient rent so as not to have an incentive to imitate the high quality types, prices charged by high quality firms also need to be high enough. Note, however, that unlike the unambiguous signaling distortion (profit loss) in the single seller case, the upward pressure on prices when multiple competing firms signal product quality can often work to their advantage as it may increase their market power and profits.
The symmetric fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria in our model exhibit a wide range of market power -sometimes ranging from almost the full information monopoly outcome to almost competitive outcomes (where prices are close to true marginal cost). As the number of firms becomes indefinitely large, low quality prices converge in distribution to marginal cost and their market power disappears. This however may not be true for high quality firms. In 3 In the existing literature on strategic models of price competition in oligopoly, price dispersion (in the form of mixed strategy equilibria) arises because of capacity constraints (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983) , search cost (see, e.g., Reinganum, 1979 and Stahl, 1989) , captive market segments (Varian, 1980) , uncertainty about the existence of rival firms (Janssen and Rasmusen, 2002) etc. 4 Even though prices signal quality perfectly, there is significant variation in prices across firms selling identical quality which suggests that a weak empirical relationship between price and quality differences across firms may not necessarily imply that prices do not reveal information about quality; see, e.g. Gerstner (1985) .
fact, under certain conditions, fully revealing equilibria where high quality firms charge their full information monopoly price are sustained no matter how large the number of firms. The reason behind this is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs can deter high quality firms from reducing their price. Note that from a certain point of view, the mark-up of the high quality price above marginal cost that we find is arguably different from the usual notion of market power as the seller may actually lose all buyers if it reduces price. One can think of this mark-up therefore as reflecting some notion of "equilibrium" market power.
By allowing high quality firms to charge a high price, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs also allow low quality firms to earn sufficient rent so as to deter imitation of high quality prices and therefore play an important role in sustaining fully revealing equilibria. It is, therefore, important to examine the reasonableness of these out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
In order to do this, we apply a strong refinement of signaling equilibriumthe D1 criterion-to our model (which, unlike a pure signaling game, involves multiple senders). We show that there exists a unique symmetric fully revealing outcome that meets the D1 refinement. Further, this is the equilibrium with the lowest degree of market power among all the symmetric fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria characterized by us. As mentioned earlier, signaling may require high quality firms to exercise market power in order to allow low quality firms to earn sufficient rent. As a consequence, the unique symmetric fully revealing D1 outcome may involve market power for both low and high quality types and further, under certain conditions, market power of high quality firms may persist even as the number of firms becomes infinitely large. Thus, the possibility of signaling quality through prices, the market power of firms in the signaling outcome and the persistence of market power (as market concentration tends to zero) are all robust to a strong refinement of signaling equilibrium.
As the prior probability of high quality converges to zero, the fully revealing outcomes converge to competitive marginal cost pricing (the Bertrand outcome). In contrast, when the prior probability of quality being high converges to one, market power of high quality firms (sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs) may persist and the limiting outcome may not be the competitive Bertrand outcome (even though incomplete information vanishes in the limit).
In the monopoly model analyzed by Bagwell and Riordan (1991) , the downward sloping market demand curve for high quality plays an important role in providing incentives for separation of types. Using a unit demand specification, Ellingsen (1997) obtains fully revealing equilibria by allowing consumers to randomize their purchasing decisions. If consumers buy with sufficiently low probability at a price equal to their valuation for high quality, then low quality sellers are dissuaded from imitating that price. We rely on a similar mechanism for some of the fully revealing equilibria where the price charged by high quality firms equals the valuation for high quality. For other equilibria, the mechanism in our model is different and explicitly uses competition between firms. In particular, even when the total quantity sold in the market is identical for every price configuration that arises in equilibrium, the incentives for signaling are created endogenously by differences in expected market share of each firm at different prices and the fact that the high quality price is (sufficiently) undercut by rivals with higher probability than low quality prices.
One feature of the fully revealing equilibria of our basic model is that a high quality product is sold only in the state where all firms are of high quality. In states of nature where both low and high quality products are available, consumers buy the low quality good almost surely. This is a consequence of the assumption that all consumers are identical and, in particular, have identical valuation for the high quality good. At the end of the paper we indicate how this feature of the signaling equilibria disappears if we introduce heterogeneity of consumers in their valuation for the high quality good, In that case, there are fully revealing equilibrium outcomes where higher valuation consumers always buy the high quality good, if available.
Our paper is also related to other strands of the literature. Spulber (1985) considers a model of Bertrand price competition with private information about production cost, but unlike our model, consumers have no preference for the good produced at higher cost. Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) analyze a model where product quality is known to both firms in a duopoly but not to consumers and show (in stark contrast to our model) that fully revealing equilibria (satisfying a natural refinement) do not exist. Finally, Janssen and Van Reeven (1998) study the role of prices as signals of illegal practices in a model structurally similar to ours and show that prices can convey full information about quality for a subset of the parameter space.
Section 2 outlines the basic model. Section 3 contains existence and characterization results for the set of fully revealing equilibria. Section 4 analyzes the implications of the D1 refinement criterion. In Section 5, we compare the market power generated in the D1 equilibrium of our signaling model with the variations of the model where there is no role for signaling. Section 6 indicates how our results are modified in the presence of heterogeneity in consumer valuations. Section 7 concludes. Some proofs are contained in the appendix.
Basic Model
Consider an oligopolistic market with N > 1 identical firms that compete in prices. The product of each firm can be of two potential qualities -low (L) and high (H). There is no horizontal differentiation between the products of the firms. Each firm's product quality is given and information about quality is private -only a firm knows the quality of its product (it is unknown to other firms as well as consumers). However, it is common knowledge that the quality of each firm is an independent draw from a probability distribution that assigns probability α ∈ (0, 1) to high quality and probability 1 − α to low quality. Each firm produces at constant unit cost that depends on its quality. In particular, for every firm, the unit cost of production is c L , if its product is of low quality, and c H , if it is of high quality, where
There is a unit mass of risk-neutral consumers in the market. Consumers have unit demand i.e., each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. All consumers are identical and have identical valuation V L for a unit of the low quality good and V H for a unit of the high quality good, where
and further,
Formally, we have a multi-stage Bayesian game where the type τ of each firm lies in the set {H, L}; nature first draws the type of each firm i independently from a common distribution that assigns probability α ∈ (0, 1) to H − type and probability 1 − α to L − type and this move of nature is only observed by firm i. After this, firms simultaneously choose their prices. Finally, consumers observe the prices charged by firms and each consumer decides whether to buy and if so, which firm to buy from. The strategy of each firm i, i = 1, 2, ...N, is a pair of prices {p Without loss of generality, we impose a restriction on the strategy set of firms:
We allow for mixed strategies. The payoff to a consumer that buys is her expected net surplus (i.e., expected valuation of the product of the firm she buys from, net of the price charged by it) and the payoff is zero, if she does not buy. The payoff to each firm is its expected profit. The basic solution concept used throughout the paper is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In Section 4, we analyze PBE that meet the D1 refinement criterion (Cho and Sobel, 1990) .
The price signaling model analyzed by Bagwell and Riordan (1991) corresponds to a version of our model where N = 1. They assume a linear downward sloping market demand for the high quality good, while much of our analysis assumes that consumers have unit demand. Also, their model allows for informed consumers in the market. Daughety and Reinganum (2007) analyze signaling through prices in a duopoly when firms have private information about the safety of their products (probability of "failure" after purchase). Daughety and Reinganum (2008) analyze a similar model of quality signaling with more general demand and market structure (N firms). An important difference of both papers with our framework is that they require the firms' products to exhibit a certain minimum level of horizontal differentiation. While our model reduces to a standard homogenous good Bertrand price competition model (with a perfectly competitive outcome) when the two quality levels are identical, this is not true in their framework.
Finally, the D1 refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium used to select a unique symmetric signaling outcome in our paper is stronger than the refinement (Intuitive Criterion) used in these papers.
Fully Revealing Equilibrium
For prices to be fully revealing of product quality in an equilibrium, the set of prices that can possibly be charged by a high quality firm in equilibrium must be (almost surely) disjoint from that for the low quality type of that firm. It is easy to check that there is no fully revealing equilibrium in pure strategies; Bertrand price competition between (symmetric) firms eliminates the rent for low quality types that is needed to sustain a fully revealing equilibrium. Therefore, full revelation necessarily involves randomization over prices (price dispersion).
Proposition 1 There is no fully revealing equilibrium in pure strategies.
The proof of this proposition 5 follows relatively standard considerations and is omitted.
Next, we construct symmetric fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria where firms reveal high quality by charging higher price than low quality firms and show that such equilibria always exist. In particular, the equilibria we construct are ones where high quality firms charge a common deterministic price
The price charged by the low quality type of each firm follows a common probability distribution
so that a consumer is indifferent between buying high quality at price p H and buying low quality at price p L . The distribution F of low quality prices (that we derive below) has no probability mass point so that the price charged by a low quality firm is below p L almost surely. Therefore, as long as there is at least one firm selling low quality, a high quality firm sells with probability zero and all buyers buy low quality. The equilibrium profit of a low quality firm equals the profit it earns at price p L where it sells only in the state where every other firm is of high quality. This profit is given by:
The lower bound p L of the support of the price strategy of a low quality firm is the lowest price that it is willing to undercut (even if it attracts all buyers in all possible states of the world) so that:
which yields:
Observe that: At every price p ∈ [p L , p L ] charged by a low quality firm, it sells (to all consumers) as long as it is not undercut by any other low quality firm and its expected profit at price p is therefore given by :
This equals π *
as long as:
It is, in fact, easy to show that in any symmetric fully separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium where high quality firms charge a deterministic price p H , the equilibrium price distribution of the low quality firms and their equilibrium payoffs must be exactly as described above. The main arguments is as follows. As the equilibrium is symmetric, there can be no probability mass point at the upper bound p L of the price support of low quality firms (otherwise a low quality firm could strictly increase its profit by undercutting slightly). Therefore, at price p L , a low quality firm can sell only in the state where all other firms are of high quality and, further, it must sell in that state (to earn strictly positive rent so as to not have incentive to imitate the high quality price). However, if consumers strictly prefer to buy low quality at price p L (in that state), then a low quality firm can increase profit by charging price above p L . Therefore, consumers must be indifferent between buying high quality at price p H and buying low quality at price p L . Finally, low quality firm must sell to all consumers at price p L in the state where all other firms are of high quality; otherwise, consumers would have to be indifferent between buying low quality at price p L and not buying at all which implies that a low quality firm would increase its profit by charging a slightly lower price. The other properties of the distribution of prices of low quality firms follow immediately.
Observe that the equilibrium price distribution and expected profit of each low quality firm is fully determined by the high quality price p H ; an increase in p H increases the upper and lower bounds of the low quality price support, leads to a first-order stochastic increase in the distribution of the price charged by a low quality firm and increases the equilibrium profits of both types of firms (π * L and π * H ). In this kind of equilibrium, high quality firms sell only in the state where all firms are of high quality; in that state, consumers are indifferent between all firms and the firms split the total quantity demanded equally. There are two possibilities: (i) all buyers buy with probability one in the state where all firms charge price p H ; (ii) some buyers do not buy (or equivalently, buyers randomize between buying and not buying) in the state where all firms charge price p H . Obviously, in case (ii), buyers must be indifferent between buying and not buying so that
We will first analyze the incentive conditions for an equilibrium where (i) holds. In this kind of equilibrium, a high quality firm sells quantity 1 N in the state where all other firms are of high quality; as this is the only state in which it sells, the equilibrium (expected) profit of a high quality firm is given by:
First, consider the incentive of a low quality firm to imitate the price p H charged by high quality firms. Such a deviation is not strictly gainful if, and only if,
A low quality type does not imitate a high quality type as long as the high quality price is above a lower bound. While this appears paradoxical at first glance, the explanation for this lies in the fact that an increase in the high quality price p H not only increases the profit that the low quality firm can obtain by deviating to such a price but also increases the equilibrium profit π * L of the low quality firm; the latter increases more sharply than the former.
With a single seller facing a downward sloping market demand curve for high quality (as in Bagwell and Riordan, 1991) , deterring mimicry by the low quality seller may require significant upward distortion in the high quality price (relative to the fully information level) in order to reduce the quality sold by high quality firms sufficiently. When the market structure is more competitive, the incentive to mimic can be neutralized by ensuring that the expected market share for an individual high quality firm is significantly smaller than a low quality firm (see, Daughety and Reinganum, 2008) . In the equilibrium we describe here, high quality firms that charge a high price are always undercut with a large margin by low quality rivals and therefore, sell with lower probability than low quality firms. This lower probability of selling is generated endogenously through the equilibrium price strategies. Observe that the incentive condition (9) is more likely to hold as N increases and this reflects the fact that more competitive market structures make it easier to deter mimicry by low quality firms.
Next, consider the incentive of a high quality firm to imitate a low quality firm and charge
Thus, the optimal deviation for a high quality firm if it wishes to imitate a low quality firm is to charge price p L . This deviation is not gainful if, and only if,:
and, using (5) this yields:
As the high quality price increases, not only does it tend to increase the profit of the high quality type but, as explained earlier, it also tends to increase low quality prices (in a first-order stochastic sense); the former tends to reduce the incentive of the high quality firm to imitate the low quality firm while the latter has the opposite effect. As the latter effect is stronger, the incentive compatibility condition for the high quality type involves an upper bound on the high quality price. Observe that a more competitive structure (higher N ) tends to reduce the expected quantity sold by a high quality firm and this increases the incentive of a high quality firm to mimic a low quality firm.
It is easy to check that for appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs no firm has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to any out-of-equilibrium price. The out-ofequilibrium beliefs of buyers can be specified as follows: if consumers observe a firm charging a price
, they believe that the firm has a low quality product with probability 1. As a result, consumers strictly prefer to not buy from a firm that unilaterally deviates from the equilibrium and charges price p ∈ (p L , p H ); they are better off buying from some other firm. Firms, therefore do not want to deviate to such prices. Deviating to any price p > p H cannot be gainful as all consumers strictly prefer to buy from some other firm even if they believe that the deviating firm's product quality is high with probability one. Finally, (given (11)), deviating to a price p < p L cannot be strictly gainful either. Thus, the strategies described above (along with the specified out-of-equilibrium beliefs) constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if, and only if, the high quality price p H ∈ [c H , V H ] satisfies the incentive compatibility conditions (9) and (11) i.e., if
After some simplifications, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such price p H is that
We summarize the above discussion in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 There exists a symmetric fully revealing equilibrium where all high quality firms charge (a deterministic) common price p H and all buyers buy with probability one if, and only if,
The set of prices that can be sustained as the high quality price p H in any such equilibrium is the interval [θ 0 , θ 1 ]. In such an equilibrium, the low quality firms follow a mixed price strategy with (5), (7) and (8). The equilibrium profits of high and low quality firms are as defined in (6) and (10).
Observe that (13) is more likely to hold as the number of firms N increases i.e., as the market structure is more competitive. As N increases, the expected market share of a high quality firm becomes smaller and this reduces the incentive of the low quality seller to imitate the high price.
We now discuss the incentive conditions for a symmetric fully revealing equilibrium where all high quality firms charge price p H = V H but only a fraction η ∈ [0, 1) of consumers buy (or equivalently, each consumer buys with probability η) in the state where all firms are of high quality.
As before, a high quality firm sells only in the state where all firms are of high quality and in that state each firm sells η N units so that the equilibrium (expected) profit of a high quality firm is given by:
Given p H = V H ,the mixed price strategy of a low quality firm is obtained from (5), (7) and (8) . In particular, p L = V L . The equilibrium payoff of a low quality firm follows from (6):
We now proceed to discuss the conditions under which firms have no incentive to deviate from the outlined strategies. First, consider the incentive of a low quality firm to imitate the price V H charged by high quality firms. Such a deviation is not strictly gainful if, and only if,
As the RHS of (14) is positive, (14) can always be satisfied by choosing η sufficiently small. In this kind of equilibrium, the incentive of the low quality firm to mimic the high quality firm is deterred by reducing the total quantity sold in the market in the state where all firms have high quality products. This is the mechanism that is also used by Ellingsen (1997).
Next, consider the incentive of a high quality firm to imitate a low quality firm and charge some price p ∈ [p L , p L ]. As before, one can show that the optimal deviation for a high quality firm if it wishes to imitate a low quality firm is to charge price p L = V L and this deviation is not strictly gainful if, and only if,:
It is easy to check that given the out-of-equilibrium beliefs and conditions (14) and (15), no firm has any incentive to deviate to any "out-of-equilibrium"
. Thus, the strategies described above (along with the specified out-of-equilibrium beliefs) constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if, and only if, there exists η ∈ [0, 1) satisfying the incentive compatibility conditions (14) and (15) . As c L < c H , there exists η ∈ (0, 1] satisfying (14) and (15) if, and only if,
Note that (16) is also a necessary and sufficient condition for
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a symmetric fully revealing equilibrium where high quality firms charge price V H and all buyers buy with probability one. Thus:
Lemma 2 There exists a symmetric fully revealing equilibrium where every high quality firm charges price p H = V H if, and only if,
then in the state where all firms are of high quality, only a fraction η < 1 of buyers buy (or equivalently each buyer buys with probability η) where
Note that (18) is always satisfied if V L ≤ c H (no matter how large the number of firms) and if V L > c H , it is satisfied as long as the number of firms is not too large.
It is easy to check that the conditions (13) and (18) together cover the entire parameter space and this yields the following core proposition: Proposition 2 (i) A fully revealing equilibrium always exists. In particular, there is a symmetric fully revealing equilibrium where all high quality firms charge a deterministic price p H . In such an equilibrium, the low quality firms (must) (5) and (7) and F by (8) .
(ii) If (13) holds, the set of prices that can be sustained as high quality price p H in such an equilibrium is the interval [θ 0 , θ 1 ] given in (12) .
(iii) If (13) does not hold, the high quality price in such an equilibrium is necessarily equal to the full information monopoly price V H (and a fraction of buyers do not buy or, each buyer buys with probability less than one).
(iv) There is a (symmetric fully revealing) equilibrium where all high quality firms charge the full information monopoly price V H (and the upper bound p L of the low quality firms' price support is equal to their full information monopoly price V L ) if, and only if, (18) holds.
(v) There is a (symmetric fully revealing equilibrium) where all high quality firms charge their marginal cost i.e., p H = c H if, and only if, (13) holds and
While parts (i) − (iv) of the proposition follow readily from Lemmas 1 and 2, part (v) follows from the definition of θ 0 .
Let Ω denote the set of equilibria described by Proposition 2 i.e., Ω is the set of symmetric fully revealing equilibria where high quality firms charge a deterministic price. 6 From Proposition 2 we know that Ω is always non-empty. Further, the degree of market power in any equilibrium in Ω is captured by the high quality price p H ; equilibria with higher values of p H are associated with (first-order) stochastically higher prices and profits for low quality firms. Proposition 2 shows the degree of market power varies widely across the set Ω.
The conditions (such as (18) or (19)) in Proposition 2 for the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium with various degrees of market power (as indexed by p H ) are independent of the prior probability α that a firm is of high quality. At α = 0 or α = 1, the model degenerates to a complete information homogenous good Bertrand model with zero market power. Yet, high degree of market power (bounded away from zero) may persist for every α ∈ (0, 1).
It is of some interest to examine the behavior of low quality firms as the number of firms N becomes indefinitely large and for a given N, as the prior probability of a firm's product being of low quality goes to one. In both cases, the rent earned by low quality firms and their market power converge to zero. 6 There may be symmetric fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria where both high and low quality firms play non-degenerate mixed strategies. For example, high quality price may follow a two-point disrcete distribution with support {p H , p H } with p H > p H > c H and consumers are indifferent between buying low quality at price p L and high quality at price p H . The incentive of a high quality firm to undercut p H slightly can be deterred by the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of buyers. However, as we will see in the next section, such beliefs may not be very reasonable and as a result, these equilibria do not satisfy strong refinement criteria such as the D1 criterion.
In particular, the random price charged by a low quality firm converges in distribution to a degenerate distribution at the marginal cost for low quality.
Corollary 1 Ceteris paribus, if either N → ∞ or α → 0, the probability distribution of prices followed by a low quality firm in any symmetric fully revealing equilibrium in Ω converges to the degenerate distribution δ(c L ) that charges price equal to its marginal cost c L with probability one.
The proof of this result follows immediately from Proposition 2(i), the fact that p L → c L as N → ∞ or α → 0 and that for any fixed > 0 small enough
The intuition behind the above result is straightforward. The reason why price competition between low quality firms does not reduce their price to marginal cost is the guarantee of limited monopoly power to every low quality firm in the state where all other firms are of high quality; the probability of this state goes to zero as N → ∞ or α → 0. A similar result, however, does not necessarily hold for high-quality firms. As we have seen, if V L ≤ c H , a fully revealing equilibrium where high quality firms charge their monopoly price V H with probability one can be sustained in equilibrium even as α → 1 or N → ∞. A high quality firm may not undercut its rivals if, at lower prices, the out-ofequilibrium beliefs of buyers perceive the quality to be low with high probability. This dampens price competition even if there are a large number of rivals with high quality products.
As is apparent from the discussion in this section, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs play an important role in sustaining the fully revealing perfect Bayesian outcomes characterized in this section. In particular, the incentive of a high quality firm to undercut the deterministic price p H in order to steal business from rivals in the state where all other firms are of high quality (the only state in which it sells) is deterred by consumers' beliefs that any firm charging price p ∈ (p L , p H ) must be of low quality type with probability one. As noted above, this also plays an important role in sustaining a certain level of market power in the equilibrium outcomes. It is therefore important to examine the reasonableness of these beliefs. It can be shown that 7 the specified out-of-equilibrium beliefs in all of the fully revealing equilibria in Ω satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) . The main argument here is that low quality firms have an incentive to charge a price p ∈ (p L , p H ) if the probability that they can sell at such price is high enough; therefore, the intuitive criterion cannot rule out the possibility that these prices are set by low quality firms. In the next section, we will see that a significantly stronger refinement such as the D1 criterion can be select a unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium.
D1 Equilibrium
In this section, we examine the extent to which the symmetric fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria analyzed in the previous section satisfy a strong refinement -the D1 criterion (Cho and Sobel, 1990 ). The D1 criterion was developed in the context of pure signaling games with one sender. The game we consider here is a multiple sender game. In principle, the beliefs of the receivers (buyers) in our model are mappings from the observed vector of prices set by all N firms (senders) to the joint distribution of the types of N firms. However, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of consumers when two or more firms choose actions outside the support of their equilibrium strategies do not affect the incentives for unilateral deviation by any player and hence play no role in supporting a particular equilibrium. To evaluate whether the system of beliefs supporting an equilibrium is reasonable, we confine attention to beliefs of buyers when they observe a single firm charge an out-of-equilibrium price while others continue to choose prices according to their equilibrium strategy.
In a pure signaling game with one sender, deviation by the sender to an outof-equilibrium signal generates a set of possible optimal actions or best responses of the receiver. With multiple senders, every best response of the receiver to this deviation is a mapping from the set of signals of other senders to the action set of the receiver. Comparing the incentive to deviate in terms of sets of mappings can be somewhat complicated. In what follows, we modify and adapt the D1 criterion to our model in a manner that retains tractability.
Consider a firm i that unilaterally deviates to a certain price p that lies outside the support of its equilibrium strategy. Given the (possibly mixed) equilibrium strategies of other firms, each profile of prior beliefs that buyers may possibly have about the type of firm i (following this deviation) and each profile of best responses of buyers (based on every such belief profile) defines a certain expected quantity sold by firm i at price p. Let B i (p) be the set of of all possible expected quantities sold (by firm i at price p) that can be generated in this manner by considering all possible beliefs and best responses of buyers. 8 Each q i ∈ B i (p) ⊂ [0, 1] is a quantity that firm i can "expect" to sell at price p for some profile of beliefs of buyers about firm i 0 s type and for some configuration 8 A more formal definition of B i (p) is as follows. Fix p. Let p −i denote the vector of prices charged by firms j 6 = i. The belief of a buyer associates with each (p, p −i ) a probability that firm i is of type H. Consider any profile of beliefs, one for each buyer. For each p −i , the equilibrium strategies of firms j 6 = i generates a posterior distribution of the types of firms j 6 = i. Each buyer can therefore determine a set of optimal purchase decisions given p and p −i . Thus, for any out-of-equilibrium belief of the buyer, her best response to p is a correspondence from the set of all possible p −i to a (possibly mixed) purchase decision. The prior distribution of types of firms j 6 = i and their equilibrium strategies define a probability distribution F −i over all possible p −i that can arise when firms j 6 = i stick to their equilibrium strategy. Given p and using F −i , every measurable selection from the best response correspondence for each buyer determines an expected quantity sold by firm i and doing this for all possible selections, we can generate a set of expected quantities sold by firm i at price p for a given profile of beliefs (where the expectation is taken prior to observing prices set by other firms). If we repeat this for every profile of beliefs that buyers may possibly have about the type of firm i, we generate the set B i (p).
of optimal choices of buyers (that depends on realizations of prices charged by other firms) when other firms play according to their equilibrium strategy.
Since the expected profit of firm i at price p is a linear function of the expected quantity sold, the set B i (p) aggregates the possible rational responses of all buyers in a payoff relevant fashion. In the spirit of the D1 criterion, we compare the subsets of expected quantities in B i (p) for which it is gainful for different types of firm i to deviate to price p.
More precisely, consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the equilibrium profit of firm i when it is of type τ is given by π i * τ , τ = H, L. Consider any p ∈ [0, V H ] outside the support of the equilibrium price strategy of firm i. If for τ , τ 0 ∈ {H, L}, τ 0 6 = τ,
where "⊂ " stands for strict inclusion, then the D1 refinement suggests that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of buyers (upon observing a unilateral deviation by firm i to price p) should assign zero probability to the event that firm i is of type τ and thus (as there are only two types), assign probability one to firm i being of type τ 0 . We will now apply this criterion to examine the symmetric fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria in Ω. Recall that the lowest price that can be charged by high quality sellers in an equilibrium in Ω is given by min{θ 0 , V H } where
Our first result indicates that the D1 refinement rules out every equilibrium in Ω where the high quality price exceeds min{θ 0 , V H }.
Lemma 3
No perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Ω where the high quality price p H 6 = min{θ 0 , V H } survives the D1 refinement.
A proof of this lemma is contained in the Appendix. The basic intuition behind this result is as follows. Using Proposition 2(iii), if min{θ 0 , V H } = V H , then there is only one equilibrium outcome in Ω and in this outcome p H = V H . Therefore, confine attention to the situation where θ 0 < V H . In any equilibrium in Ω, the high quality price p H determines the upper bound of the support of low quality prices and therefore, the equilibrium profit of the low quality seller.
, then the low quality seller's profit when he imitates the price charged by a high quality seller is exactly equal to his equilibrium profit. If the high quality price is larger than [
, then the low quality seller's equilibrium profit is strictly larger than what he can get by imitating the price p H charged by a high quality seller. Now, if the fully revealing equilibrium is one where the high quality price p H > θ 0 ≥ [
, then (by continuity) low quality sellers would have a strict incentive to not deviate to a price just below p H unless the (expected) quantity sold jumps up by a significant discontinuous amount (as we move from p H to a price just below p H ). On the other hand, the high quality seller will have an incentive to deviate to price slightly below p H if the quantity sold increases slightly (in a continuous fashion). Therefore, the range of buyers' responses for which the high quality seller deviates to a price just below p H is larger than that for the low quality seller. The D1 refinement then requires that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs assign probability one to the event that a firm that unilaterally deviates to a price just below p H is a high quality firm. However, with such beliefs, a high quality firm always has an incentive to deviate to a slightly lower price in order to undercut all its rivals in the only state of the world in which it sells (i.e., when all other firms are of high quality).
The above argument indicates (and we show formally in the appendix) that the equilibrium in Ω where the high quality price is equal to min{θ 0 , V H } meets the D1 refinement. It can also be shown that there cannot be a symmetric fully revealing D1 equilibrium that is outside the set Ω i.e., one where high quality firms play mixed strategies. This leads to the following key result:
Proposition 3 There exists a unique symmetric fully revealing D1 equilibrium. If (13) holds, then in this equilibrium, high quality firms charge a deterministic price equal to θ 0 and all consumers buy with probability one. If (13) does not hold, then this equilibrium is one where high quality firms charge a deterministic price equal to V H (all consumers may not buy with probability one).
A formal proof of Proposition 3 is contained in the Appendix. The proposition implies that there is a unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium that meets the D1 criterion and in this equilibrium, high quality firms exercise market power as long as
or,
Further, if (20) holds, then the high quality price is bounded below by V H − V L + c L > c H for all N, i.e., market power persists for high quality firms even as N → ∞. The intuition behind this is straightforward; under (20), if the high quality good is sold at price p H = c H , then no consumer buys the low quality good (even if it is sold at marginal cost) and therefore, there is no rent for low quality sellers. Full revelation of information therefore requires that the high quality price be above (and in fact, bounded away from) c H .
One interesting observation that can be made here relates to the effect of a decrease in V L , the consumers' valuation of the low quality good, on the equilibrium profit of low quality firms. Consider the range of parameters for which the unique fully revealing D1 equilibrium is one where the high quality
. This holds if, and only if,
Using (6), the equilibrium profit of the low quality firm is then given by:
so that a decrease in V L increases the equilibrium profit of the low quality firm. For any given p H , the direct effect of a decrease in V L is to reduce the upper bound p L of the support of the low quality firm's price distribution and its profit. However, for the given range of parameters, the equilibrium high quality price
, the critical price at which a low quality firm is indifferent between imitating and not imitating the high quality price; this critical price increases as V L declines and, as mentioned earlier, the increase in p H tends to increase the low quality firm's equilibrium profit. The second effect dominates. Daughety and Reinganum (2008) contains a similar result.
Finally, a comment about pooling equilibrium outcomes. We have refrained from analyzing the possibility of fully non-revealing perfect Bayesian equilibria where both low and high quality types choose the same price. It can be shown that such equilibria may exist under certain conditions. 9 However, it turns out that no pooling equilibrium can satisfy the D1 criterion. The intuition behind this is straightforward. In a pooling equilibrium, both low and high quality types of all firms must charge a common price p lying between c H and the expected valuation of buyers (αV H + (1 − α)V L ). Suppose that for some profile of beliefs and best responses of the consumers (and given the equilibrium strategies of other firms), a low quality firm gains weakly by deviating to a price slightly above p. As the high quality type has a higher marginal cost than the low quality firm, it must necessarily gain (strictly) from a similar deviation. The set of responses of the buyers (in terms of expected quantity sold) for which the high quality type gains by deviating to such a price is larger than that of the low quality type. D1 refinement then implies that buyers should assign probability one to the event that the deviating firm is a high quality firm. But with such beliefs, all consumers buy from the firm that unilaterally deviates to a price slightly above p, (whereas in equilibrium, the firm splits the market with all other rivals). Therefore, the deviation is strictly gainful.
The results of this section reinforce the idea that competition leads to revelation of information. Further, the fact that persistent market power may emerge in the unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium under a very strong refinement of out-of-equilibrium beliefs indicates the importance of the link between incomplete information, information revelation and market power. 9 A complete characterization of the set of pooling perfect Bayesian equilibria is contained in Janssen and Roy, 2007, Section 5. It can be shown that such an equilibrium exists if, and only if,
and under this condition, the set of prices that can be sustained as the common pooling equilibrium price is the interval [c H ,
, it follows from (21) that no pooling equilibrium exists if N is large.
Signaling, Information and Market Power
In this section, we briefly discuss the role of signaling under asymmetric information in creating and sustaining market power. To do this, we focus on the unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium that meets the D1 refinement as this is the outcome with the lowest degree of market power and profits (for both low and high quality firms) of all the perfect Bayesian fully revealing equilibria in the set Ω. In the rest of this section, we will refer to this equilibrium outcome as the signaling outcome.
In order to separate the pure effect of signaling on market power from that arising due to price setting under incomplete information about rival firms, we consider a modified version of our game where, as in our model, firms with private information about their own product quality set prices simultaneously (without knowing the realized product qualities of other firms). Unlike our model, however, the realized product qualities of all firms are publicly observed after prices are set. We refer to this game as the modified Bayesian game.
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For ease of exposition we will assume that N = 2. Note that in this game, consumers observe quality prior to purchase so that there is no need for firms to signal private information about product quality.
We now informally outline the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this modified game. If
then firms of quality τ 0 charge a price equal to their marginal cost c τ 0 earning zero profit and firms of quality τ play a mixed price strategy with a continuous distribution function F τ and support [p τ , p τ ] where
Consumers are indifferent between buying quality τ 0 at marginal cost and quality τ at price p τ ; at the latter price, a firm with quality τ sells only in the state where the other firm's product quality is τ 0 and sells to all consumers with probability one in that state. This is the unique symmetric equilibrium if the inequality in (22) is strict. To see how this equilibrium is constructed, suppose (22) holds for
The largest price that a high quality firm will set is therefore p H = c L +(V H −V L ) as at any higher price it will not sell (whatever the type of the competing firm) and at this price it makes a profit of π *
The equilibrium distribution function ensures that the profit of the high quality firm when it charges any p ∈ [p H , p H ] equals π * H :
Given the rival firm's strategy, a low quality firm has no incentive to deviate as it sells zero quantity at any price higher than c L (whatever the rival's product quality). A high quality firm cannot sell at price higher than p H and it sells to all consumers with probability one at p H , so that it cannot gain by charging an even lower price. Thus, the modified Bayesian game generates strictly positive market power and profits for one type of firm. Evaluating the signaling outcome for N = 2 of our model and comparing it with the equilibrium outcome of the modified Bayesian game yields the following conclusion.
. In our signaling model, a low quality firm always exercises strictly positive market power and a high quality firm charges price p H = 2(V H − V L ) + c L which is strictly higher than the highest price in the modified game. Thus, both types of firms exercise more market power in the signaling model.
The modified game generates zero market power for high quality firms while in our signaling model, p H ≥ c H and high quality firms exercise strictly positive market power if
the price distribution of low quality firms in the signaling outcome is identical to the price distribution of low quality firms in the modified Bayesian game, while it exhibits first-order stochastic dominance
To sum up, signaling always generates at least as much market power and often, strictly more market power for both types of firms relative to the outcome of the modified game. In other words, firms' incentives to signal their quality to consumers generates additional market power over and above that arising from price setting under incomplete information.
Heterogeneous Consumers
One feature of the fully revealing equilibria discussed in Sections 3 and 4 is that a high quality product is sold only in the state where all firms are of high quality. In states of nature where both low and high quality products are available, consumers buy the low quality good, i.e., in such states, high prices signal high quality, but nobody buys at the higher price. This is a consequence of the assumption that all consumers are identical and, in particular, have identical valuation for the high quality good.
This unsavory feature of the revealing equilibrium can, however, be eliminated if consumers differ in their valuation of the high quality good 11 and in that case, signaling of private information through prices is perfectly consistent with a market outcome where some consumers (those with higher valuation for the high quality good) always buy high quality at high price while other (lower valuation) consumers buy low quality (when both types of goods are available in the market).
To illustrate the effect of introducing heterogeneity of consumers consider a simple extension of the basic model outlined in Section 2. Assume, as before, that there is a unit mass of consumers, each with unit demand, but now suppose there are two types of consumers -named type 1 (high valuation) and type 2 (low valuation). The measure of type 1 consumers is λ ∈ (0, 1) and that of type 2 consumers is 1 − λ. Type 1 consumers have valuation V H and type 2 consumers have valuation V H for quality H. All consumers have identical valuation V L > c L for quality L. Assume that:
All other aspects of the model remain unchanged. In this extended model, one can show that under certain conditions, there are symmetric fully revealing equilibria where all high quality sellers charge a deterministic price 
As our analysis of the extended model with heterogenous buyers case does not provide any significant additional insight into the possibility of signaling through prices apart from showing that signaling is consistent with both low and high quality goods being sold simultaneously in the market, we do not provide a formal result, but instead illustrate it by providing an example in the appendix where N = 2.In this example, we focus on an equilibrium where
The following constraints are binding in an equilibrium of the kind described above: (i) high valuation consumers prefer to buy high quality, (ii) low quality sellers have no incentive to mimic high quality sellers, and (iii) low quality sellers do not have incentive to attract high valuation consumers away from high quality firms. Constraint (iii) plays a crucial role in this type of equilibrium. The three constraints are more likely to be satisfied if λ, the fraction of high valuation consumers, is relatively small. It is also more likely to hold if α, the probability that a rival firm is of high quality, is relatively large so that the low quality firms earn sufficient rent in equilibrium. Finally, as p H = V H , the larger the surplus V H − V H earned by high valuation buyers while buying from high quality firms, the lower the incentive of the low quality firms to try to attract such buyers with low prices.
Conclusion
Competition is not inimical to signaling of private information about product quality by firms. Even when price competition is intense and there are no other market frictions or features that soften competition, the market outcome under incomplete information can generate sufficient incentives for full revelation of information about quality. In such situations, signaling outcomes are associated with endogenously generated price dispersion and stochastic market power. Fully revealing equilibria may be associated with high degree of market power even when market concentration is very small. This remains true even if the out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy strong refinement criteria such as the D1 criterion. Further, the D1 refinement criterion rules out all pooling equilibria and under such refinement, competition must necessarily lead to (at least partial) revelation of quality through prices.
Our results have been established in a very simple framework with two types of product quality. Intuitively, it appears that it may be possible to extend our core arguments to a model with a finite number of quality types, 12 but the analysis is likely to be significantly more complicated. Future research in this direction should be of considerable interest.
Appendix
Proof Lemma 3: If θ 0 ≥ V H , then from Lemmas 1 and 2, we have that there is a unique fully revealing equilibrium outcome in Ω and it is the one where p H = V H . Consider therefore, the case where θ 0 < V H (so that min{θ 0 , V H } = θ 0 ) and any symmetric fully revealing equilibrium in Ω where the high quality price
The equilibrium profits of L and H types are then given by:
Consider a price p = p H − where > 0 is arbitrarily small so that p > θ 0 and p ∈ (p L , p H ). We examine the incentives of the high and low quality types of some firm i to unilaterally deviate and charge p. Consider any expected quantity q i ∈ B i (p) that can be sold by firm i at price p (where B i (p) is as defined in the discussion on D1 refinement in Section 4) such that ,
so that
The profit of H-type of firm i when it deviates to p and sells expected quantity q i :
Using (24),
It follows that if > 0 is small enough N [
H . Thus, we have shown that for p = p H − where > 0 is small enough,
We now argue that the inclusion in the above relationship is strict. To see this, consider q i = ξb q where 0 < ξ ≤ 1 and
We will choose > 0 small enough such that for p = p H − , σ = VL−VH +pH −cL p−c L < 1. Suppose (1 − σξ) consumers believe that the firm deviating to price p is of type H with probability 0 and σξ consumers believe that it is of type H with probability μ where
the realization of types of other firms and their equilibrium strategies) it is a best response for exactly σξ consumers to buy from the deviating firm i at price p in the state where all other firms charge price p H (and to not buy from firm i at all in any other state) so that the expected quantity sold by firm i for this profile of beliefs and optimal actions is ξb q = σξα
so that L-type of firm i has a strict incentive to not deviate to p if the expected quantity sold at that price is ξb q. On the other hand,
, we have from (27), that for > 0 small enough, (p−c H )b q > π * H and therefore for all ξ < 1 sufficiently close to 1,
where ⊂ stands for strict inclusion. The D1 refinement therefore suggests that upon observing a unilateral deviation by firm i to a price p = p H − where > 0 is small enough, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs should assign probability one to the event that the firm is of type H. However, in that case a H-type firm i deviating to price p will sell to all consumers in the state where all other firms are of type H charging price p H and therefore earns a deviation profit at least as large as
H for > 0 sufficiently small. Thus, deviation by H-type firm i would be strictly gainful. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, suppose that (13) holds. From Lemma 1 we know that there is a fully revealing perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Ω where all high quality firms charge p H = θ 0 and all consumers buy with probability one. We will show that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs supporting this equilibrium as outlined in the arguments in Section 3 leading to Lemma 1 satisfy the D1 refinement. First, note that for any out-of-equilibrium price p < c H , the beliefs assign probability one to the event that the firm charging such a price is L-type. This is perfectly consistent with D1 refinement as H-type firm could never gain strictly by deviating to such a price. Second, for any out-of-equilibrium price p > p H , the D1 refinement imposes no restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. This is because if a firm unilaterally deviates to such a price, it sells zero (given the equilibrium strategies of other firms) no matter what buyers believe about its type. Therefore, neither type can gain strictly by unilateral deviation to such a price. Finally, consider out-of-equilibrium prices p ∈ (c H , θ 0 ).
show that for p ∈ (c H , θ 0 ), the D1 refinement is consistent with (i.e., does not rule out) assigning probability 1 to the event that a firm unilaterally deviating to p is of type L. It is sufficient to establish that
for any q i ∈ B i (p). Consider any
This establishes (29). Next, we consider the case where (13) does not hold. In that case, min{θ 0 , V H } = V H . Using Lemmas 1 and 2, the equilibrium outcome in Ω is necessarily one where p H = V H and the quantity sold in the market when all firms are of type
We will show that the equilibrium where
is, in fact, the unique D1 equilibrium in Ω. To see this, consider a deviation to a price p 0 just below V H (above p L = V L ). Let the expected quantity sold at this price be q(p 0 ).The equilibrium expected profits of low and high quality firms are given by 
and so it follows (by continuity) that there exists
in which case, D1 criterion suggests that after observing this price p 0 , the consumer should believe it is set by a high quality firm with probability one; this however creates an incentive for a high quality firm to deviate to such a price to attract all buyers (in the state where all other firms charge p H ). Therefore, ε > 0 i.e., η < N
.This follows from the fact that:
(The derivative of the RHS w.r.t. p 0 is equal to
2 and as the LHS and the RHS are equal to each other at p 0 = V H , so that the inequality follows.) Therefore, the out of equilibrium belief that a firm deviating to p 0 ∈ (V L , V H ) is of L−type with probability one is consistent with D1 refinement and therefore the equilibrium in Ω where
is, in fact, the unique D1 equilibrium in Ω.
It remains to show that there is no symmetric fully revealing D1 equilibrium outside the set Ω i.e., one where high quality firms randomize over prices. Suppose to the contrary that such an equilibrium exists and let p H , p H be the lower and upper bounds of the support of the distribution of high quality price. As the equilibrium is symmetric, there can be no probability mass point at the upper bound p L of the price support of low quality firms (otherwise a low quality firm could strictly increase its profit by undercutting slightly). Therefore, at price p L , a low quality firm can sell only in the state where all other firms are of high quality and, further, it must sell in that state (to earn strictly positive rent so as to not have incentive to imitate the high quality price). If V L − p L > V H − p H , the low quality firm can increase its price beyond p L and sell the same expected quantity. On the other hand, suppose V L − p L < V H − p H .At price p L , an L − type firm does not sell unless all other firms are of type H and charge price > p H + (for some > 0); if this L − type firm now deviates from price p L to p H , he will be perceived as a high quality firm and not only sell in the event that he would have sold at price p L but also in the event that other firms are either of type H and charge price ∈ [p H , p H + ) or of type L and charge price ∈ [p L , p L − η) for some η > 0.Thus, his expected quantity sold increases as he increases his price from p L to p H and this implies that his expected profit increases, a contradiction. Therefore:
Moreover, the same considerations that yield (9) in the main text (low quality sellers should not have an incentive to mimic high quality prices), imply that
+ c L . Further, since p H > p H ≥ c H , there is some price p > c H in the support of high quality firm's price distribution where it sells with strictly positive probability so that its equilibrium expected profit is strictly positive. Therefore, p H > c H . Thus, p H > p H > θ 0 = max{c H ,
+c L }. Also, high quality firms must charge p H with strictly positive probability for otherwise a firm charging p H sells zero with probability 1 resulting in zero profit. This, in turn, implies that there exists δ > 0 such that no price p ∈ (p H − δ, p H ) is in the support of high quality price distribution as the expected profit at p H and at prices just below it cannot be equal. Consider any out of equilibrium price b p ∈ (p H −δ, p H ), b p > θ 0 .Using very similar arguments as the proof of lemma 3, it is easy to check that the set of expected quantity sold for which it is gainful for a low quality firm to deviate to price b p is a strict subset of the corresponding set for a high quality firm so that D1 criterion requires that the out of equilibrium beliefs must regard the deviating firm to be of H−type with probability one. However, with such belief, a high quality firm will always earn higher profit at price b p close enough to p H (as all rival firms charge p H with strictly positive probability).
QED.
Extended Model with heterogeneous consumers: An Example. Consider the extended model with two types of consumers described in Section 5. Let N = 2. We construct a fully revealing equilibrium where all high quality sellers charge a deterministic price p H = V H , low quality firms randomize over an interval [p L , p L ] where p L = V L , using a continuous distribution function, all type 1 consumers buy high quality if available and all type 2 consumers buy low quality except in the state where all firms are of high quality. In such an equilibrium, the equilibrium profits of high and low quality types are
For the behavior of high-valuation consumers to be optimal, we require that even if the lowest price in the price distribution of low quality types is charged, these consumers prefer to buy the high quality, i.e.,
Given that the surplus of low-valuation consumers buying high quality is 0, these consumers always prefer to buy low quality if available.
The main question then is whether we can find parametric restrictions and out of equilibrium beliefs such that firms do not have an incentive to deviate. If low-quality types mimic the pricing behavior of high quality types, their payoff is λ(1 − α)(V H − c L ) + α 2 (V H − c L ) and incentive compatibility requires that
Condition (32) also ensures that the incentive compatibility condition for the high quality type is satisfied. If consumers have pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs, i.e., μ(p) = 0, it is easy to see that no type of firm has an incentive to charge out-of-equilibrium prices.
14 Low-quality firms may also want to deviate to a price equal to V L − (V H − V H ) in an attempt to attract all consumers. To make this deviation unprofitable, we have to require that
Conditions (31), (32) and (33) together constitute the full set of equilibrium conditions (potentially together with some conditions imposed by an appropriate refinement notion). These three conditions can be rewritten as: 
